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Summary findings
Anderson and Martin  provide simple, robust rules for  When a publicly provided good is sold for less than its
evaluating public spending in distorted economies. Their  full value to consumers, one must take into account the
analysis integrates within a clean, unified framework  implications for government revenues of providing
previous treatments of project evaluation as special cases.  public goods. Anderson and Martin  present project
Until recently it was widely believed that government  evaluation rules that are more complex than the border
projects could be evaluated without reference to the cost  price rule but involve only one additional parameter: the
of raising tax revenues. The classic border price rule  compensated marginal cost of funds for the taxes on
provided a simple and apparently robust procedure for  which the government relies.
project evaluation. But the border price rule developed  The rules suggested involve adjusting the fiscal
in shadow pricing literature requires very strong  revenues the project generates (or destroys) by the
assumptions to be valid when governments must rely on  marginal cost of funds before comparing them with the
distortionary taxation  and are unable or unwilling to  assessecd  benefits to project producers and consumers.
cover the costs of the project through user charges.  In the case of a protected but tradable good provided
Anderson and Martin use a rigorous formal model in  by the government,  the result is a shadow price that is
which governments must rely on distortionary taxation  below the world market price. Where projects produce
to explore the welfare consequences of governments  output l;hat  is sold without charge, the costs of the
providing different types of goods. They show that the  project inputs must also be adjusted using the marginal
border price rule is accurate only in one rather special  cost of Iunds. In intermediate cases where the
case: when project outputs are sold at their full value to  governmnent  levies user charges that fall below the full
consumers - something that is difficult to do with a  value ol the goods to the private sector, the revenue
public good such as a lighthouse or a functioning judicial  shortfall from the project must be adjusted by the
system.  marginal cost of funds.
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Governments  and  international  lending  organizations  need  simple,  robust
frameworks for evaluating project proposals in distorted economies. The border pricing
rule for traded goods (see, for example, Squire 1989; Dreze and Stem 1987) provides an
attractively  simple basis  for project  evaluation: regardless of distortions,  governments
slhould evaluate  the  tradable  goods they provide at  border  prices. Unfortunately,  the
border price  rule needs modification when projects are not  revenue neutral  and when
governments must rely on distortionary taxation to fund their projects. Government sale
ol- goods below  their  market  price  creates  a  revenue need which  must  be  met  from
distortionary  taxation.  The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  provide  rigorously  derived
guidelines  for  evaluating government projects in this  situation. The rule we  obtain is
operational  with  an  additional  'parameter',  the  Marginal  Cost  of  Funds,  which  is
frequently available.
The  literature  on project  evaluation has  focused heavily  on  projects  in  which
governments produce goods that are sold to the private sector at their market price (see,
for example, Squire  1989; Blitzer, Dasgupta and Stiglitz  1981). This  formulation may
have  been  reasonably  appropriate  in  an  era  where  attention  focused  primarily  on
industrial projects but, as Devarajan, Squire and Suthiwart-Narueput (1997) point out, is
of  limited  relevance  now  that  the  concerns  of  governments  and  international
organizations have shifted so strongly to the provision of an enabling  environment for
private sector development. Charging a price that equals the marginal valuation of project
output  to  the  private  sector  is  impossible  in  government  projects  that  provide2
Samuelsonian public  goods (such  as lighthouses or  functioning judicial  systems)  and
difficult for many semi-public goods such as roads.
In this paper, we use a general system of fiscal accounting for marginal changes in
the provision of public goods first outlined in Anderson and Martin (1996) that allows us
to account for various approaches to the funding of government projects. We begin with
the pure public-good case where governments provide goods without charge, but  must
pay for the inputs to these projects. We then consider the continuum of cases between
provision without charge and pricing at the marginal value of the government output to
the private  sector. Throughout, we emphasize the case where the government must rely
on distortionary taxation to fund any deficit or surplus associated with the project, and
compare this with the case where governments can obtain revenues without resorting to
distortionary taxation.
We obtain two key results that seem likely to be  useful for project evaluation.
Firstly, the shadow prices of traded  (as well as nontraded) goods are not generally equal
to their world prices, but differ from world prices by an amount that depends upon the
impact  of  the project  on  government  revenues and  on  the  Marginal  Cost  of  Funds.
Secondly, the  costs of a government project need to be adljusted  by the Marginal Cost of
Funds before being compared with the benefits accruing from the project.
The analysis leads to operational rules for project evaluation that are only slightly
more complex than the border pricing rule. The new rules depend on only one additional
parameter whose value must be estimated/simulated, the Marginal Cost of Funds (MCF).
The CGE models (or back of the envelope approximations) required to  produce MCF3
measures  are now  fairly widely available. The analyst will typically have available  a
range of values that can be plugged in to satisfy conservative evaluation procedures.
To conduct the analysis, we utilize a framework that makes explicit the role of
government in providing public goods and services subject to a budget constraint. We
consider first in Section 1 a general welfare analysis of the provision of a public good
which  is purchased  from the  rest  of the world and  paid  for out  of  distortionary  tax
revenue.  In  Section 2  we consider the nature of the resulting  shadow prices  in more
(letail.  We specialize the general expression for the shadow price of public goods in
stages, first by assuming that the public good is a perfect substitute for a private good and
then by assuming that the MCF is equal to one. Only with both assumptions met is the
shadow price equal to the border price. In Section 3 we consider the role of the MCF in
evaluating the cost of project inputs. Section 4 deals with user charges for public goods,
which are of course only feasible when such goods are excludable. Section 5 places our
results in the context of the earlier literature in order to clarify the relationship between
our  results  and  those  obtained  by  earlier  authors.  Section  6  provides  some  simple
numerical examples to highlight the potential importance allowing for the costs of raising
funds.
1. The  model
The analysis is conducted with a representative agent economy which faces fixed
international prices. Trade distortions and inefficient public  goods supply are the only
clistortions. The set of public goods provided by the government is denoted by the vector4
G.' Positive  elements of G are goods supplied by the government; negative elements of
G are  inputs purchased by government for use in its project.
The marginal willingness to pay  for a  unit of G by the representative  agent is
determined by the supply of G along with the prices of private goods which complement
or substitute  for the public goods.  A convenient approach to  specifying the marginal
willingness to pay is through a constrained net expenditure function E(p,G,u) which gives
the  minimum  net  expenditure  on  the  set  of  privately  provided  goods  necessary  to
maintain  a  particular utility  level  given G. The  vector p  refers  to  the  prices  of  the
privately produced and traded goods,  the vector G to the quantities of goods provided by
the  government,  and u  refers to  the utility  level of  a representative  consumer.  E  is
defined as the difference between the representative consumer's  constrained expenditure
function,  e(p,G,u), and the constrained gross  domestic product function, g(G, p). The
public goods argument in the gross domestic product function is understood to mean that
public goods may serve as inputs to production. The supply of public goods is purchased
abroad.
Increases in elements of G which are valued by consumers or by producers will
lower  the  cost  of  achieving  any  given  level  of  utility  - either  by  reducing  the
expenditure on private goods required to achieve that level of utility or, as in the case of
many infrastructure investments, by increasing gross domestic product.  EG is therefore
negative for products valued by the private sector, and equal to minus the virtual price, 7r,
or marginal willingness to  pay, vector of the representaitive  agent. Where the publicly
In the representative  agent  model,  government  supplied  private  goods  and pure  public  goods are
equivalent.  For treatment  of the approach  of this paper in  the many household  case,  see Anderson  (1997b).5
provided  goods are  excludable  and  do  not  generate externalities,  7t may be  directly
observable in secondary markets. However, where the publicly-provided goods are non-
excludable and/or where they create externalities 2,  7t will not be directly observable and
will need to be inferred through some form of elicitation process.
Where the publicly provided good, say good i, is a perfect substitute for a pure
private  good, 7i; must be equal to the price of the identical private good, pi, up to the point
where  the supply of  good G;  exceeds total  market demand at the domestic  price  pi
determined by world prices, pi* and the relevant tariff (pi -p;  . This perfect substitutes
case is the one generally considered in the literature on shadow pricing of traded goods,
with  the  assumption of  perfect substitutability  underlying proposals  for use  of world
prices as shadow prices of government-provided goods.
The specification of 7t using EG differs from the usual specification in the shadow
pricing literature. The usual assumption is that the output of government projects is sold
al  market  prices  (see,  for  example, Bell  and Devarajan  1983; Blitzer,  Dasgupta  and
Stiglitz  1981;  and  Squire  1989),  and  hence  i  is  observable.  In  contrast,  here  the
government determines the quantity of the good that it supplies, the supply curve to the
private sector is perfectly inelastic and any price between zero and  7i is feasible 3. The
choice of a selling price within the feasible range is one of setting user charges, which are
lump sum taxes in our representative agent model.
2  Devarajan, Squire and Suthiwart-Narueput (1997) emphasize that government expenditures are and
should be  increasingly concentrated in such goods.
3  If the project generates negative externalities, the user charge may even exceed the marginal social value
of the project output.6
We assume a small country where the government can purchase the inputs into
projects on world markets 4 at an exogenous price 7t* and private goods are traded at
world prices p . For simplicity, we assume that the output of projects is produced using
only purchased inputs. Following the standard approach in the cost-benefit literature (see,
for example, Tower and Pursell, 1987), we assume that revenue is raised by trade taxation
on private goods (other than a set of undistorted goods including the numeraire) at
specific rate vector t, equal to (p - p*). Until Section 3, we assume that the government
outputs are given away without user charges, either because the outputs are pure public
goods, or because the government is unwilling to levy user charges.
With distortionary taxation, a given supply of public goods implies a rate of
taxation which is endogenously determined along with the equilibrium real income.  The
fundamental equilibrium conditions are the government budget constraint and the private
sector budget constraint. Formally:
(1)  rr*'G  - [p - p*]'Ep(p,G,u)  =  0  government  budget  constraint
(2)  E(p, G,u)  =  0  private budget constraint.
The government budget constraint specifies that the government's spending on
the purchase of public goods is equal to its revenue from trade taxation,
[p -p*]'Ep(p,G,u). This equation can readily be generalized to include taxation on
4 As long as the goods are traded goods with perfect domestic substitutes, it does not  matter for the
analysis whether they are imported or purchased domestically. If they are purchased domestically, the
purchase price will be higher by the amount of the tariff, but this will be offset by the tariff revenue
collections, leaving a net price to the government of p  . Anderson (1996) considers an alternative case
where the government purchases its inputs from from domestic producers. Neary (1995) provides an
excellent analysis of the large country case.7
producers or consumers, user charges, lump sum redistribution to the private sector, and
capital inflows from abroad. Similarly, the private budget constraint can be generalized to
i,nclude  redistribution from the government, or inflows from abroad. While relevant in
specific applications, these extensions are not needed for the specific points that we seek
to establish.
Equations (1) and (2) determine the real income u and the required taxation. The
vector p is underdetermined,  so some convention is needed to reduce the endogenous
level of taxation to a scalar. The fiscal experiment we analyze is a parametric change in
1U,  to be financed by an endogenous change in the taxes, dp. Totally differentiating (1)
and (2) with respect to G, p and u we obtain:
(3)  [7c* - (p -p*)'E  ]dG  =  [Ep'  + (p - p*)'E  ]dp  +  (p -p*)'E  du  = 0
(4)  EG'dG  +  Ep'dp  +  Eudu  =  0.
The term multiplying dG in (3) combines the direct cost 7x with (p - p*)'EpG, the impact
of a change in G on government tax revenues.  This is the full fiscal cost of the public
good. Against this, tariff revenues must be raised through a change in p, dp, sufficient to
pay the full fiscal cost after offsetting the income effect (the term multiplying du).
To  solve  this  problem  uniquely,  we  need to  specify  a  particular  type  of  tax
package. If we focus initially on the case of proportional increases5 in all of the taxes, we
5 A straightforward  generalization  of this analysis,  considered  later  in the paper, is to focus  on a tax
package  where  prices are changed  by different  amounts.8
can express  the resulting  price changes  as dp=(p-p*)dt,  and solve  the government  budget
constraint  for dt:
(5)  dcT  =  1/[E  '(p-p*)  + (p - p*)'Epp(p-p*)].[  - (p - p*)'E  dG  - (p - p*)'E  du]
p  ~~  ~  ~~~~~~~pG  Pu
Substituting  pdT  into (4) and rearranging,  we obtain:
(6)  (1-MCF(p  - p*)'X)Eudu =  {rr  - MCF[7r*-(p  - p*)'E.G  ]3dG.
where MCF (discussed  below) is the compensated  Marginal  Cost of Funds and  XI is a
vector of income effects equal to Epu/Eu  . The expression  in curly brackets on the right
hand side of (6) is the net benefit of an increase  in G: the difference  between its virtual
price and the product of the MCF and the direct plus indirect cost of provision of the
good. The overall expression  on the right hand side of (6) gives the marginal impact of
the change in G on the balance of trade, or the size of the transfer from the rest of the
world needed to compensate  for the change in G, and hence provides a compensation
measure of the welfare  impact  of the change  (see Anderson  and Martin 1996).
The MCF term is defined as E1'(p-p*) /[E '(p-p*)  + (p - p*)'Epp(p-p*)]  (See
Anderson  and Martin 1996 for a more detailed discussion).  Its numerator  is the increase
in government  revenue  that would  have arisen from a unit iincrease  in X in the absence of
any behavioral  response. Its denominator  is the increase in revenue achieved with the
(compensated)  household free to respond to the incentives  created by the tax changes.9
Intuitively, the  MCF  shows the marginal increase  in  the tax rate  that  is  required  to
achieve the desired increase in tax revenues.  Because the denominator of the MCF will
generally be smaller than the numerator, the MCF will be greater than one. One important
special case is that of a tax on a good in perfectly inelastic supply-- in this case, the MCF
is unity since all of the relevant components of Epp  are zero. Clearly, the MCF will also
be unity when taxes are initially zero.
We diverge from much of the public economics literature in defining the MCF as
a  compensated  concept.  We  do  so  because  to  be  operational,  the  MCF  should  be
comparable  across models,  years and  countries. The uncompensated MCF  utilized  in
much  of the literature  is non-comparable, being a money-metric  utility measure.  The
definition of MCF  given above is restrictive in  assuming that the tax rate  increase is
equiproportional on all non-numeraire goods. A straightforward generalization is to focus
on a tax package where different prices are increased by different amounts, and  some
taxes may even be lowered. This can be done by specifying a diagonal weighting matrix
W and replacing p with Wp in the expression for the MCF. If desired, the elements of the
'W matrix may be chosen to minimize the MCF for any given level of required revenues
griven  knowledge of the E  matrix and the initial vector of taxes (p-p*). Adapted in this
way, the formula given in equation (6) applies in the case where revenue is raised by
optimal taxes, as well as to cases where the tax revenues are raised with any arbitrarily
specified tax6.
(i  As is emphasized  by Dreze  and  Stemn  (1985,  p919),  there  is an element  of arbitrariness  in specify'ing  how
revenue  impacts  will be dealt with, and the combination  of a bad project  and a good  tax reform  could result
/10
2. Evaluating  the  shadow  prices
We follow standard  practice  by evaluating  the shadow  price of any good as the change  in
aggregate  welfare resulting  from a marginal  increase  in the net supply of that commodity
by the public sector where the good is costlessly provided from outside the system
(Squire 1989, p 1103;  Dreze and Stern 1985,  p91 1).  Then, using this definition on the
right hand side of (6), we obtain:
(6')  (1-MCF(p  - p*)'XI)Eudu  = a.dG , where
(7)  a = [-a  + MCF(p - p*)'E  ],
is the shadow  price of the publicly  provided  good.
The shadow price includes the virtual price, which measures  the direct welfare
impact of the public good, and a term reflecting the need to make up the budgetary
consequences  of the public good supply with distortionary  taxation. Even if the good
really is provided  without direct budgetary  cost, tax changes  are required because of the
indirect revenue consequences  of its provision. This specification  is  consistent with
Harberger's  (1997,  p74) identification  of the need  to allow for the private sector taxes  that
would have been paid in the absence of the project. Equation (6') implies that the
desirability of a project is based on the difference between the shadow price of the
in acceptance  of a project  that is, in isolation,  welfare  reducing.  Sieper  (1981)  proposes  to deal with this by
restricting  attention  to optimal  tax changes.  A more  pragmatic  solution,  consistent  with  the widespread
practice  of calculating  generalized  MCFs  for each economy  (see Devarajan,  Squire  and Suthiwart-
Narueput  1997),  would  be to estimate  a feasible  marginal  tax mix for revenue  expansion  (or reduction),
and to use this same  MCF in the evaluation  of all project  alternatives.I1
government good and its direct cost times the MCF of the public funds needed to pay for
it.
We now proceed to  several special cases of the shadow price of public  goods
analyzed  in  the  literature.  When  the  public  good  and  a  private  good  are perfect
substitutes, EP,(,b  = -1 and Epj(; = 0 forj  ￿  i; and (7) reduces to:
a1 = pi - MCF(p 1-p*i).
If in addition MCF=1, as when a lump sum tax is available at the margin, then
(Ti  = Pi* 
The  shadow price  is equal  to  the  border  price under  these  assumptions.  When user
charges are levied sufficiently to pay for the project, the lump sum tax assumption is not
objectionable, and when the government project is an industrial one such as a fertilizer
plant the perfect substitutes assumption is reasonable. But the general expression in (7)
must be applied when these assumptions cannot be met.
Figure  1 allows  us to  provide some  intuition into the  difference between  the
shadow price of  a good  and the world market  price in the  important case where  the
government good is a perfect substitute for a privately provided good.12
Figure 1. Interpreting the shadow price for a  government good that is a perfect substitute




The Ep line in Figure 1 shows the compensated excess demand for good i from
the  private  sector.  The  case  illustrated  is  one  for  an  imported  good  produced  and
consumed  domestically  at  price  7r;  and  available  internationally  at  world  price  7j.
Because of the assumption of perfect substitutability between government  good i  and
private good i at this stage of the analysis, 7rj=p;  and  7ij  =  pi . The provision of an amount
of government good i equal to AG, effectively shifts the y axis rightwards, reducing the
compensated quantity of good i imported by  AG; . The only impact of government
provision of the good is to crowd out an exactly equal amount of the private imported
good. There are no impacts in other markets since there are no induced price changes in
this perfect-substitutes case-- nor are there any impacts through factor markets, since the13
good is assumed to be produced without cost in this section. Without price impacts, there
are also no impacts on the profitability of existing government projects to be considered.
In this case, the shadow price of government good i is given by: ai= [7 + MCF(p 1
- p*)'EPiGi]  =[7  - MCF(7ri  - 7ti*)]  = 7n*-  MEB(iti - 7ri*), where MEB = MCF - 1 is the
rmarginal  excess burden of the taxes under consideration.  Clearly, if MCF is unity and
MEB = 0, as in the case where the government has available a lump sum tax, we obtain
the conventional result that  a1 = 7j* as a special case.
Where the government relies on distortionary taxes to replace lost revenues, the
shadow  price of a public good that is a perfect substitute for a protected import will be
less than its world market price. This result has a simple intuitive explanation. It arises
because the reduction in government revenues resulting from provision of this good has a
social  cost  greater  than  the  amount  of  revenue  lost.  It  also  has  a  simple  policy
implication. The benefit of government provision of a good that is subject to  domestic
protection is even less than would be implied by the border price rule. In this case, the
benefit must be adjusted to allow for the costs of raising the tariff revenues dissipated by
provision of the government good.
It  is  clear  that  the  reformulation  of  shadow  prices  developed  above  has
fundamental  implications for shadow pricing.  The level  of the shadow price  for each
traded good is changed away from its border price by an amount that depends upon the
size of the distortion in that particular market  so relative shadow prices must change,
potentially  substantially. It is even possible that the shadow price for a good perfectly14
substitutable with a highly protected import will be negative. This is particularly likely if
the government must rely on severely distortionary taxes at the margin.
The right hand side of equation (7) also gives the shadow prices in cases where
the  government  good is  an  imperfect substitute  for the privately  traded  good, or  the
private good is nontraded. In this case, the interpretation is somewhat more complex than
in Figure  1, since revenue impacts beyond the market for this particular commodity must
be  taken  into account.  However,  all that  is  required  is to  consider the  compensated
impacts on distorted markets and modern computing software allows simplified models
incorporating such interactions to be solved in spreadsheet packages such as EXCEL or
programming  languages  such as GAMS (see Anderson (1997a) or Martin  and Alston
(1996)  for  analyses  of  welfare  impacts  in  distorted  open  economies).  Alternatively,
simple back-of-the-envelope calculations of  the type used  by Loo  and  Tower  (1995)
might be used to take into account these cross-market interactions. For practical studies, a
counterpart of the standard conversion factor that looms so large in partial equilibrium
cost-benefit techniques could be estimated and applied to a range of nontraded goods.
3. Calculating  the cost of project  inputs
Given our simple formulation, the direct cost to the government of its project
inputs is given by ni*dG' where 7ri*  is the price vector and dG' is a vector of inputs
purchased for use in the project. Where the role of the government is merely to purchase
and supply goods, as in countries where government agencies supply fertilizer to farmers,
dGI will be the negative of the dG discussed in the previous section. Most projects15
involve government agencies in  purchasing one set of inputs (eg building materials and
electricity) which are combined to produce a different set of outputs (eg lighthouse
services).
The cost of purchasing the project inputs can be obtained by totally differentiating
equations (1) and (2) with respect to dGd,  p and u and following the approach used in
obtaining equation (6). Since we are considering the purchase, but not the installation, of
the public goods in this section, the EPG terms are all zero and the social cost of
purchasing this package of  inputs is given by:
(9)  (1-MCF(p - p*)'XI)Eudu =  MCF.at  dGI
Equation (8) has a simple intuitive interpretation. The costs of project inputs must
be scaled, relative to the benefits of project outputs, by the marginal costs of raising the
tax revenues required to finance them. Since this is a relative price change, it will have
ireal implications for resource evaluation; in the normal case where the MCF is above
umity, it will increase the height of the hurdle which must be jumped before projects are
accepted. It will not, however, change the relative prices of inputs since MCF is a scalar.
Equations (6) and (8) highlight the importance of the tax mix used, at the margin,
ito  fund government projects. Only in some circumstances will it be clear what tax mix is
relevant to a particular project. One such case is where a broadly satisfactory tax regime
has been established and budget balancing takes place through marginal changes in rates
within that tax base.  Another is the case where the public output is excludable and the16
direct  and  indirect changes in  government revenues generated by the project  can be
accommodated  through user charges.
4. Incorporating  user charges
A major difference between this paper and the earlier theoretical literature is  that
we view the price charged by government for its output as the outcome of a decision on
user charges. In most of the earlier literature, it is assumed that output is automatically
sold at its marginal value to the private sector. In practice, the level of user charges varies
greatly depending both upon economic factors such as the ease by which private agents
can be excluded from consumption of the publicly-provided good, and upon political
economy considerations. Thus, it seems important to provide a formal analysis
incorporating the consequences of different settings of user costs.
Allowing for user charges set at c.7t  per unit of projrect  output, where c is a
diagonal matrix showing the share of the marginal social valuation of each output levied
as a user charge, and introducing the impacts of changes in G on the revenues raised by
the government from user charges on its entire portfolio of projects, the counterpart of
equation (6) is
(9)  (1-MCF(p - p*)'XI)Eudu  [{t  + MCF(p -p*)'EpG  }+ MEB.{c.7t  + G'cEyG } ]dG
- MCFir*dG'.
The first term in curly brackets on the right hand side of (9) gives the shadow
price for government output in this case. The second term in curly brackets reflects the
impact of this project on revenue from user charges both from this project and from other17
affected projects. The MEB.c.7r  component of this term reflects the reduction in the costs
of distortionary taxation resulting from the user charges on the new government output.
The MEB.G'cEGG component reflects the impact of changes in the virtual prices of
existing government projects on the revenues collected by the government from user
charges on its entire portfolio of projects (see Squire 1989).
If the goods under consideration are perfect substitutes for  privately traded goods,
EPG is -1  for each government supplied good, and the term EGG disappears, allowing (9)
to be simplified to:
(9')  (1-MCF(p - p*)'XI)E,du =  [p - MCF(p - p*) + MEB.c.p ]dG - MCF.7C*dG
The expression in square brackets on the right hand side of (9') has three elements: the
virtual prices of project outputs, p; the induced impacts on tariff revenues; and the impact
of user charge revenues on the provided goods. Equation (9') seems likely to be of wide
use, since it treats the elements of c as choice parameters, as is generally the case in
practical applications, rather than assuming unrealistically that they are always unity.
Equation (9') may be rewritten in an alternative form consistent with the
recommendations  of Devarajan, Squire and Suthiwart-Narueput (1997) and  Harberger
(1997) that project evaluation should take into account both the value of the project at
shadow prices, and the impact of the project on net government revenues:
(9")  (1-MCF(p -p*)'XI)Eudu =  p*dG -7r*dG' + MEB{(c.p -(p-p*))dG -7n*  dG' }
Equation (9") has the desirable feature of making very clear what revenues need
to be taken into account when premultiplying by MEB, and their dependence on18
decisions about user charges. If, for instance, user charges are set to zero, the adjustment
to the border pricing rule would involve both the direct costs of the project 71* dG'  and
the indirect impacts on government revenues created by the project, -(p-p*))dG. If full
user charges are levied, the adjustment will be applied to the project's losses or gains at
border prices.
If c equals unity, (9') may be simplified further to:
(l-MCF(p - p*)'XI)Eudu =  MCF.(p .dG - Tc*dG')
With c equaling unity, we return to the traditional result that  shadow prices for
traded goods with full user pricing are, up to a scalar multiple, equal to their border
prices. However, the formulation used highlights how sensitive this result is to the
assumption that full user charges are applied.
The assumption of full user pricing embodied in the last equation is very strong
and it seems very desirable to have equations (9') and (8) available to deal with the
common situation in which full user pricing is infeasible either on economic or political
grounds.
5. Relationship with the earlier literature
Given the importance placed on the border price rule in the literature, it seems
worthwhile examining why our results differ from those previously reported. Some
studies that have focused on the evaluation of projects when governments must rely on
distortionary taxation are Warr (1979), Bell and Devarajan ('1983), Blitzer, Dasgupta and
Stiglitz (1981), Dreze and Stem (1985), Dinwiddy and Teal (1987), Squire (1989),19
Kaplow  (1996), Devarajan, Squire and Suthiwart-Narueput (1997), and Harberger (1997).
Much of the early literature concerned itself with sufficient conditions for the border price
rule under the perception that the general case was not operational. Our dealing with the
general case, in contrast, yields simple rules which are operational, even for nontraded
goods, in an era of commonly available CGE models.
Warr (1979) provided an important justification for the border price rule, even
when governments must rely on distortionary taxation. Assuming that governments levy
full user charges, he demonstrated using a 2 factor, 3 product model, that a project that
breaks even at shadow prices will have a zero impact on the government budget once the
induced impact on project revenues and tax receipts is taken into consideration. In this
situation, the appropriate shadow price for a traded good will be the border price. A
similar result could be obtained quite generally by integrating over changes in project
outputs using the definition of a shadow price as the value at domestic prices plus the
induced impact on government revenues (Dreze and Stem 1985, p964 ). While valid, and
irnportant, both of these results are specific to the case of full user charges, and apply
only at the criterion point where the project has a zero value at shadow prices.
Bell and Devarajan (1983, p469) showed, using specific functional forms for a 3
sector, one factor model, and assuming full user charges, that the shadow prices of traded
goods are equal to border prices when governments rely on nondistortionary taxation.
NVhen  governments must rely on distortionary taxes or transfers, they showed  (p474) that
the shadow prices of traded goods were border prices multiplied by a scalar which
corresponds to the MCF in our framework. Our result is consistent with theirs for the20
special case of full user pricing but allows, like the intuitive argument in Devarajan,
Squire and Narueput-Suthiwart (1997), for user charges below the full virtual prices of
government outputs.
Blitzer, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1981) concluded that shadow prices for traded
goods are equal to border prices when governments rely on nondistorting taxation.
However, when governments must rely on commodity taxation, they concluded that
shadow prices lie above border prices, and below domestic market prices (1981, p67).
Dinwiddy and Teal (1987) showed that this sharp difference in results from the rest of the
literature arose because the Blitzer, Dasgupta and Stiglitz model did not specify how tax
revenues were utilized in the model.
After specifying that tax revenues were redistributed costlessly to the consumer,
Dinwiddy and Teal (1987) obtained shadow prices for traded goods equal to border prices
both when the government relied on nondistorting taxation and when it relied on
distortionary taxation. The second result is surprising since, in this model, public sector
output is obtained without cost, and is sold to the private sector at market prices. The
profit from this should allow tax rates to be lowered, and generate a second round benefit
equal to MEB.p.dG, yielding a marginal welfare impact of MCF.p* as shown by equation
(9'). The difference between their results and ours seems to arise because the Dinwiddy
and Teal analysis did not take into account the second-best welfare impacts arising from
the induced change in the volume of imports passing over the trade distortion (see their
equation 23, page 483). Their result corresponds to ours only in cases where the MCF is21
unity, such as where the tax distortion is introduced from an initial zero tax rate, or lump
SUrTn  taxes are available.
The general shadow pricing formula provided by our equation (9) clearly has a
great deal in common with the expressions for the shadow prices of nontraded goods
provided by Dreze and Stem (1985, p964) and Squire (1989, pl I 10), both of which
included one term for the marginal domestic valuation of the good and a second for the
impact on government tax revenues. Ignoring, for a moment, our expression for the
revenue impacts through project user charges, our formulation differs from theirs in pre-
multiplying the government revenue term by the MCF to take into account the costs of
raising revenues.  Where the MCF is unity, our expression becomes identical with the
sha,dow  pricing expression given by Dreze and Stem and by Squire.  Squire's analysis
(1989, pl 114) clearly recognized the costs of raising revenues in one important case.
When he generalized his shadow price expression to incorporate the impacts on the
revenues obtained from government projects, he included a term analogous to the MCF.
Our analysis is consistent with Kaplow's (1996) in excluding the income effects
of taxation from the criterion for project acceptance. These terms appear only on the left
hand side of equation (9) and hence have no impact on the sign of the cost-benefit
criterion. However, our results show that, in a distorted economy where full user cost
pricing is not adopted, the distortionary costs of taxation must be taken into account when
evaluating the desirability of a project, even where all goods are traded. When the public
goods being provided are nontraded, the marginal cost of taxation must always be taken
into account because of the need to finance the induced impact on government revenues.22
As can be seen from equations (9) and (9'), our recommendations are completely
consistent with those advanced by Devarajan, Squire and Narueput-Suthiwart (1997)  and
endorsed by Harberger (1997). The contribution of our analysis is to provide a rigorous
derivation of the shadow pricing formulas to be used. Having a more rigorous foundation
for the analysis is appealing given the confusion that has arisen in the past, particularly
when the border price rule was used without recognizing the extent to which it is
conditional on the costs of replacing induced changes in government revenues. Our
formulas are likely to be particularly useful in evaluations involving government
provision of nontraded goods, where the impacts on government revenues extend further
than in the case of traded goods.
6. Implications for project acceptance decisions
The approach to shadow pricing outlined in this paper has potentially major
implications for project evaluation. To illustrate the potenrial magnitude of the
adjustments likely to be required, we consider a very simple project involving only traded
goods. The project produces a good that, at world prices, generates $100 of benefits and
is supplied without user charges. It requires inputs valued at $100 at world prices. We
consider border price distortions on outputs ranging from -25 percent (an export tax or
import subsidy) to 50 percent. We consider MCF values ranging from 1 (the lump-sum
tax case) to 1.5, which are well within the range reported by Devarajan, Squire and
Suthiwart-Narueput (1997) for developing countries.23
Table 1. Shadow values of the project under different assumptions
Tariff rate on outputs
MCF  -25  0  25  50
1  0  0  0  0
1.25  -18.75  -25  -31.25  -37.5
1.5  -37.5  -50  -62.5  -75
The results presented in Table 1 highlight the great practical importance  of the
adjustments outlined in this paper for accurate shadow pricing and project evaluation.
Even if the project's inputs and outputs are undistorted, the need to resort to distortionary
funding may dramatically lower the net benefits of the project, as is evident in Column 2.
The net costs will be lower if the outputs from the project are subject to negative taxation.
When the project outputs are perfect substitutes for private goods that are protected, the
distortionary costs associated with project financing are compounded by the need to
finance the tax revenue losses created by the project. Even for the parameter values
identified in Table 1, these costs may dramatically change the outlook for a project.
Where protection rates or the MCF are higher, the impact will be even greater.
These results highlight a need to pay particular attention to the financing
implications of a government project and its interaction with government policies. The
hurdle for project acceptance is likely to be substantially lowered if it can be financed by
non-distortionary taxes, such as user charges. Further, government projects that increase
output in industries that are taxed are far more likely to contribute to social welfare than24
projects that increase output of subsidized commodities. These examples also highlight
the ease with which the adjustments may be made, as long as an estimate of the MCF is
available.
The dramatic impacts observed in this numerical example are not confined to
textbook cases. Devarajan, Squire and Suthiwart-Narueput (1997, p42) found in real-
world examples that the net present values of their projects were highly sensitive to the
level of the user charges used to fund them, and hence the distortion costs induced by
having to raise revenues to cover the project's operating deficit. A key point of their
paper is that the incorporation of the government revenue implications of projects is
typically quite manageable, even in practical project evaluations.
Conclusions
In this paper, we provide a general framework for estimating shadow prices of
traded  and  nontraded goods taking into account the  implications of  project  financing
decisions, and particularly the  choice of user charges for government-provided  goods.
Using  this  framework, we  develop  simple rules  for project  evaluation that  take  into
account the implications of the project for the government budget, and the induced need
to change distortionary tax rates.
One of our key results is that the border pricing rule for traded goods can be
preserved, but only if project outputs are subject to full user charging, and then only as a
decision criterion, rather than as a method of evaluating total project benefits or costs. A
more general rule, taking into account the impact of partial user charges on the financing25
burden imposed by the project, is presented to deal with situations involving other levels
of user charges. This rule appears to be new, and to be of wide applicability.
Our analysis highlights the  importance of the (compensated) marginal cost  of
funds  when  evaluating  government  projects.  While  the  rules  we  propose  for  the
evaduation of public projects are more complex than the standard use of world prices,
they do not seem unmanageably so. If an estimate of the MCF applying to funds raised
for a government project is available, then shadow prices for traded goods can readily be
calculated using only the MCF and the price information (domestic and world prices)
generally required for cost-benefit analysis. We hope that the formal derivations of rules
for project evaluation presented in this paper will be of use in practical project evaluation.26
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